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ON THE NOTION OF POLITICAL AGENCY
Political agency may be the easiest notion to define and the most complicated at the same 
time. Such ambivalence is not just a play on words: in fact, it depends on what being a political 
agent means, if that being is any citizen or any individual in se. Further questions arise: is 
political agency something like a status to be acknowledged to any human being or to any 
member of a democratic polity? Are there requirements to be fulfilled, in order to be labelled 
as political agents? 
Basically, an agent is the one who is ‘capable to act’; meanwhile, ‘agency’ means that capacity 
or, even, the expression of that capacity. In some detail, political agent is the one who is 
‘capable to act’ politically: that is, someone who is capable of participating in a ‘common’ 
exercise of political power. The accent on the idea of a collective exercise of power is 
paramount: in such an account of political agency the more a person is ‘isolated’ from other 
people, the more her political agency diminishes.
Beyond this very general meaning of political agent, there is further room for a deeper 
examination (Marchetti 2013). For example, some authors see political agency as the 
capacity to take part in the struggle to define the models of a common life, stressing the 
conflictual dimension of politics (Mouffe 2005). Other scholars understand political agency 
in a liberal view, as being the strategic capacity to coordinate with others in order to 
settle a fair society. These are only two ways to understand political agency. Generally, all 
traditions share a preoccupation with the issue of power. The point is about legitimacy: we 
should ask when power may be coercive, when coercion is legitimate, who is legitimate to 
coerce others and why. If ‘the state’ has been the traditional actor, its role and functions 
are being transformed by the process of globalization: a state’s capacity to influence the 
political course is now controversial. Given this context, further articulation of the notion 
of political agency is needed: questions such as what political actorness means today, what 
doing politics means in the present time wait for better answers. Differently, by eluding these 
philosophical questions of what political agency is and what being a political agent means, 
the debate would be anchored to an out-of-date understanding of political agency as rooted 
in conventional images of political actorness, while ignoring what currently challenges the 
traditional political thinking. By doing so, we would fail to capture politics in the real world, 
while giving up taking reality seriously. 
The present issue of Phenomenology and Mind entitled “Unpacking Political Agency: Equality, 
Vulnerability, Discrimination” contains a selection of papers presented at San Raffaele Spring 
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School of Philosophy (SRSSP) 2018 written by contributors selected through a double-blind 
peer review process. Moreover, it includes invited papers (subjected to peer review process as 
well) written by scholars working on the topic of political agency, who were not able to attend 
the SRSSP, but whose contributions may have added some value to this debate. SRSSP was held 
at Vita-Salute San Raffaele University in Milan, in June (5th – 7th) 2018. It was organized by the 
research centers CeSEP, CRESA, gender, IRCECP, and PERSONA of the Faculty of Philosophy, 
and it also received support from the Faculty and the Ph.D. program.
The aim of this SRSSP was to try and fill the gap between traditional theoretical accounts of 
political agency and the new practical challenges addressed by this notion in different domains, 
thus investigating political agency in relation to vulnerability, discrimination, migration, 
equality, and the community. Contributors were asked to reflect upon the notion of political 
agency within their respective fields of expertise, exploring issues such as the followings: 
what does it mean to be a political agent, which is her identity, why a form of political agency 
emerged and in what context, what practices the agents concerned do undertake. 
Drawing from the collected contributions, this special issue is organized through four thematic 
sections: Political Agency, Vulnerability and Discrimination; Political Agency and Migration; 
Political Agency and Equality; and Political Collective Agency. 
The first section – Political Agency, Vulnerability and Discrimination – hosts the two 
papers written by Luca Iacovone and Valeria Venditti. 
Drawing from the well-known distinction between inherent vulnerability and situational 
vulnerability (Mackenzie et al. 2014), Luca Iacovone focuses on the notion of vulnerable 
population or vulnerable group, analyzing the effects of the vulnerable group-based 
approach in the case law of European Court of Human Rights. Taking the Chapman v. the 
United Kingdom (2001) European Court of Human Rights’ judgment as case study, he criticizes 
the very concept of vulnerable population as it has been traditionally interpreted and used 
within this framework, on the basis of two main reasons. First, it turns out “constructing 
and reiterating the idea of stable identities”. Moreover, and consequently, “it reduces the 
political agency of the social actors through the boundaries defined by the list of the available 
vulnerable groups”. Against this background and starting from the belief that vulnerability 
still represents a promising concept, he sketches out “a multifaced conception of vulnerability 
meant to take into account at the same time its universality and its specificity”. As such, 
vulnerability does no longer conflict with the notion of agency, but becomes the condition of 
possibility for agency itself. 
Not less problematic than the notion of vulnerability is the one of inclusion, on which the 
contribution of Valeria Venditti revolves around. Despite being a powerful political tool in 
virtue of its promise of allowing people to gain access to forms of recognition, according to 
Venditti “the vast majority of models of political inclusion requires people’s adhering to fixed 
policy matrixes that do not allow the articulation of forms of life falling short of the standards 
that these matrixes incorporate”. Moving far from traditional accounts, the author suggests to 
embrace an alternative form of political inclusion, which appears able to “revitalize political 
agency by valuing practices carried out in smaller social networks of solidarity – ones that 
entail some sort of normativity but are characterised by fluidity and proximity”.
The second section – Political Agency and Migration – hosts the four papers written by 
Silvia Mocchi, Gaetano Marco Latronico, Francesca Pongiglione and Roberta Sala, and Elettra 
Repetto. 
Insofar as it deals with the notion of vulnerability, the contribution of Francesca Pongiglione 
and Roberta Sala builds a bridge between the first and the second section of this special 
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issue. The two authors embrace an ontological as well as political concept of vulnerability, 
considered as “a distinctive feature of human beings on which our duties towards each other 
are grounded”. Drawing from this definition, they claim that, although migrants are, by 
definition, vulnerable agents (as they flee from wars, dictatorships, poverty, climate change, 
and/or other calamities), they nonetheless should not be considered as entitled of duties of 
beneficence, but of justice. By doing this, they explicitly take a distance from David Miller, who 
refers to duties of beneficence while speaking of migrants, and argue that pursuing justice, in 
this context, also requires the fulfillment of the duty to host migrants, as their vulnerability is 
not due to some kind of misfortune, but to some form of injustice. 
On the question wondering whether migrants – ‘undocumented’ migrants, in particular – 
may be political agents and, in case of positive answer, what does it mean for migrants to be 
political agents, is built the contribution of Elettra Repetto. The author rejects a so-to-say 
ontological account of political agency, denying that such a notion may be reduced to a status 
represented, in this context, by the right to vote. Differently, and following Arendt amongst 
others, Repetto argues that “whenever a person expresses herself in the public forum, in a 
legal or in an illegal way, addressing the incumbents or the other residents, participating in 
setting the agenda of what should matter for the community and discussing how institutions 
should implement the obligations individuals have towards each other, she expresses herself 
in a political way”. By saying this, Repetto endorses a more inclusive and broad definition of 
political agency, which requires capacity and action, and which has, as its main implication, 
that migrants may become political agents who deserve to be heard ‘simply’ by acting and 
voicing their claims as autonomous individuals. 
Precisely on the concept of participation on a national and local level as the core content of 
political agency focuses, instead, the contribution of Silvia Mocchi. The author argues in favor 
of a two-fold strategy aimed at addressing social and political marginalization experienced 
by minorities, in particular migrants. On the one hand, at a national level, political agency for 
immigrants should be enhanced “through a system of enfranchisement designed to improve 
the participation rights of outsiders”. On the other hand, and insofar as enfranchisement alone 
is not enough to allow a proper participation, this should be accompanied by a residency-based 
policy. Through the expressions used by the same author, whether at a national level political 
agency requires “modifying restrictive citizenship laws that are based on the ius soli principle 
[…], the demos at local level should be enlarged in line with the principle of ius domicilii”.
Finally, a broader theoretical perspective underpins the contribution of Gaetano Marco 
Latronico. Starting from the consideration that the phenomenon of immigration considered 
in its general meaning of “human mobility” is far from being a recent one, the author relates 
present occurrences of such phenomenon to fundamental dynamics shaping contemporary 
societies. Namely, the author argues that the so-called “neo-liberal” turn in “advanced 
capitalistic societies” generates impersonal dynamics that “appears to put into question the 
same political capacity of classically conceived National States” as primary political actors. 
Within this context, the phenomenon of immigration seems to require the elaboration of new 
coping strategies from the part of established political actors, which could also foreground the 
lived experiences and political agency of immigrant groups.
The third section, entitled “Political Agency and Equality”, contains the two papers written 
by Federica Liveriero and Dragan Kuljanin. 
In The Social Bases of Self-respect. Political Equality and Epistemic Injustice Federica Liveriero 
defends a non-ideal account of political equality that relies on both moral and epistemic 
features. This specification, according to the author, is extremely important insofar as “it 
helps developing a framework that defines epistemic forms of injustice as instances of social 
suffering that endanger the very possibility for agents to be granted the social bases of self-
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respect”. Recovering the epistemic dimension of political equality, pretty underestimated 
by the contemporary debates, may have a positive impact on members belonging to 
disadvantaged groups, who may feel themselves as devoid of political agency, if subjected to 
“structural injustices related to epistemic wrongs”. The conclusion of Liveriero’s reasoning 
is that, if the epistemic dimension of political equality matters, “political institutions have a 
duty to contrast forms of epistemic injustice, because these injustices do not simply concern 
the horizontal interpersonal relationships among citizens but, rather, are detrimental to the 
enactment of the ideal of political equality in institutional contexts as well”. 
In his contribution, Dragan Kuljanin investigates the intriguing topic of epistocracy. After 
having introduced what the authors summarize as the two assumptions of epistocratic systems 
– equal political rights are not fundamental rights, and democracy cannot be considered as 
endowed with a privileged epistemic status – he focuses on one of the epistemic accounts 
developed by Brennan, namely “restricted suffrage”. By showing all the (fatal, according to 
the author) problems that restricted suffrage epistocracy poses, such as the level of knowledge 
dilemma, and the epistemic problems related to the identification of the epistocrats, Kuljanin 
ends up supporting – albeit indirectly – democracy over epistocracy. The conclusion is, in the 
author’s view, that “the most promising way to solve, or at least minimize, the problem of 
an uninformed electorate lies in more equality (economic, social, gender and racial), better 
and more accessible education, public and publicly-spirited media, and not in abandoning 
democracy”. 
The last section, entitled “Political Collective Agency”, contains the two contributions of 
Adélaïde de lastic and Marco di Feo. 
Both authors defend a collective account of political agency, the first contributor wondering 
whether enterprises may be considered as political collective agents, the second contributor 
focusing on a core issue of political agency in its collective stance, i.e. social integration. 
More in details, Adélaïde de lastic argues in favour of an ontological account of political 
collective agency applied to the reality of enterprises. In her view, enterprises may be defined 
as specific kinds of social objects, presenting intrinsic properties which, if considered as a 
whole, enable them to act as a group with a definite political significance. On the other hand, 
and drawing from a phenomenological perspective, Marco di Feo investigates the importance 
of social integration in relation to collective political agency, where the former is broadly 
defined as “a processes of personal change, in which the subjects involved have to find a way 
of living together”, i.e. intersubjectivity. After having identified four possible ways in which 
intersubjectivity occur – namely community, society, territory, and state – the author claims 
that “Since the failed integration of new subjects may have a deep negative impact on the life 
of communities, on the flow of social interactions and on the order of legality, causing critical 
situations of social exclusion, then social integration, in all its forms, must be always a priority 
of the political agenda”. 
Throughout the contributions of this special issue, the notion of political agency appears in 
its entirety and complexity, as a multifaced concept, that may be investigated from different 
perspectives and within different disciplinary domains, and which may be referenced to the 
individual as well as to the community. Despite the intrinsic and unavoidable complexity 
characterizing the notion of political agency, we hope that this special issue may help 
clarifying the different layers of a debate, which, in our view, will deserve, in the near future, 
ever more consideration. 
We are grateful to all those who made this experience possible. First, we would like to thank 
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Second, we would like to thank all the members of the Scientific Direction of the School for 
having allowed us to organize the SRSSP and prompted us to edit this special issue. 
Last but not least, we are very grateful to the administrative personnel and all the members 
of the Organizing Committee of the School for all their efforts before and during this special 
event.
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